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Defense Report On Drugs

Vice Adm. Mack Describes New Policy Directions

Revisions in Department of Defense policy on drug abuse have been recommended by a task group headed by Vice Admiral William P. Mack, USN, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). A statement of the study was presented Aug. 20 by Admiral Mack to the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate. Following are excerpts from the statement:

The Armed Forces' drug problem stems from the country's drug problem. The exact scope and nature of the country's drug problem has been estimated by many investigative authorities, but statistics are still partial and unreliable. Conservatively, estimates can be made that 10 million Americans have tried marijuana, and that 25 per cent of high school age children are or have been marijuana experimenters. The size of the heroin problem is not known, but an indicator is the 1969 figure of 68,600 addicts in the City of New York (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) and the estimate that the true figure may have been as high as 75,000. Statistics on use of other dangerous drugs are equally discouraging. In summary, drug abuse has grown radically in this country in the last few years, and particularly in the high school age group from where the majority of Armed Forces recruits and draftees are obtained.

Young people entering the Armed Services bring with them the habits, frustrations, and difficulties they have known in civilian life. To date, there has been no reliable method of examining entrants to determine those who are actual or potential drug abusers. Until one is developed, the Armed Services will continue to receive many young people who have used drugs and many who are psychologically disposed to use them. For many so disposed, tensions and frustrations encountered in the Armed Services may well bring on drug abuse.

Unknown Factor

The extent of drug abuse in the Armed Services is not precisely known, although it is probably not more widespread than in the civilian population. Exact statistics are difficult to produce because of the nature of the offense of drug abuse. Members of the Armed Services are naturally reluctant to answer a drug abuse questionnaire under the eyes of supervisory personnel since an admission may constitute an offense under military law.

Anonymous questionnaires, by their nature, may produce inaccurate responses inherent in such a system and, as in any survey, the results are consequently only approximations.

The abuse of marijuana in Southeast Asia is far greater than in the Armed Services as a whole but the abuse of hard narcotics and dangerous drugs is greater in CONUS and worldwide than in Vietnam. Drugs, particularly marijuana, are cheap and readily available in the Far East. Daily hardship, danger, boredom, and fatigue, aid in producing a climate in which drug abuse may flourish. Today, many young military leaders are technically qualified to perform their military duties but some may lack the maturity and experience necessary in counselling and leading young and inexperienced troops to forego indulgence in drug abuse.

The Department of Defense compiles a summary of investigations of drug abuse cases which shows clearly an alarming increase of cases investigated in the Republic of Vietnam, in CONUS and worldwide. In any event, the incidence of drug abuse can be characterized as very serious. The nature of the problem however is not such that at this point military readiness is considered to be endangered. The real impact is the

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Secretary Laird Names High Level Group To Act On Blue Ribbon Defense Report

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced plans Aug. 6 to appoint a "Blue Ribbon Action Committee" to work on implementation of decisions made by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to achieve improvements in the management of the Department of Defense.

Secretary Laird's Statement

In announcing plans to establish the Blue Ribbon Action Committee, Secretary Laird said:

"It is our objective to make major reductions in overhead staffing throughout the Department. I am convinced that this can be done at the same time we improve our performance. I

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Defense Drug Report

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possibility of permanent damage to the minds and bodies of the thousands of young men who are using narcotics and dangerous drugs worldwide, and who are using strong, dangerous varieties of marijuana and hard narcotics which are available worldwide and particularly in and near the Republic of Vietnam.

Other factors contribute to the nature of the problem. One obvious and over-simplified solution would be to prevent drugs and narcotics from reaching our servicemen. Such a solution is unfortunately not in sight, although extensive coordinated efforts are being made at the highest level of the Executive Branch. Particularly, efforts are being made to divert the Turkish poppy crop and to close the Mexican border to marijuana and other dangerous drug smuggling. For the foreseeable future we must continue to anticipate an atmosphere in which dangerous drugs, including narcotics and marijuana, are relatively easy to obtain.

In summary, the nature of the problem can be described as the necessity to eliminate drug abuse in the Armed Forces in a national atmosphere in which drugs are illegal but readily available and not, unfortunately, universally condemned.

Conclusions

As a result of its investigations and deliberations, the Task Group concluded:

1—There is a serious and growing problem of drug abuse in the United States.

2—This problem extends to the Armed Forces, DoD civilian employees, and to dependents of both.

3—Precise and comprehensive data as to the extent of the problem in the United States and in the Armed Forces does not exist, but sufficient data is available to permit the formulation of possible solutions to the problem.

4—There is no assured, complete solution to the problem.

5—The problems must be attacked within the Armed Services by mustering all possible forces and exerting strong efforts.

6—Every effort must be made to keep past or potential drug addicts, suppliers, or users as defined in the report from entering the Armed Services.

7—A carefully planned, universal educational effort must be expanded beyond past and present programs to cover all members of the Armed Forces including the Reserve Forces, DoD employees, and dependents at all periods of their lives and careers.

8—Where education fails and drug abuse occurs, the abusers must be dealt with quickly, firmly, and fairly, but with enlightened methods that assure that the best interests of the Government and the individuals are served.

9—Where discipline fails, every reasonable effort, subject to available resources, must be made to rehabilitate those who might be of further use to the Armed Services. More serious cases should be considered for sufficient rehabilitation to permit them to re-enter society. A balance between the best interests of the Government and the individual must be reached. Where rehabilitation within the Services' facilities is not possible, liaison with the Veterans Administration and state and local agencies must assure that those discharged as needing further treatment and rehabilitation are guided to those agencies.

Vice Adm. William P. Mack, USN

10—The discharge system now in effect in the Armed Forces represents a fair and proper method of categorizing service. Changes in it should not be made for the sole reason of allowing drug abusers to receive Veterans benefits. Changes in basic law should be sought to provide a solution to this problem.

11—Research should continue in the Armed Forces and in all agencies of the Federal Government at a rapid pace in all areas of drug abuse and in manpower techniques to permit us to improve the screening, education, discipline, and rehabilitation of personnel and to allow faster, more positive detection and identification of narcotics and dangerous drugs.

Recommendations

The Task Group report made a number of recommendations. These recommendations fall in major categories as follows:

1—Categories of Drugs and Users

2—Screening of Those Entering Military Service

3—Education and Information

4—Discipline and Discharge

5—Rehabilitation

In general, these recommendations buttress and support policies already promulgated and in some cases instituted in various areas of the world on a trial basis. The recommendations in several areas sharpen those policies and where needed, add focus and attention to combat this growing problem. For example, an individual will not necessarily be precluded from serving his country if he has experimented with some of the

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dangerous drugs. The report states in Recommendation 11 as follows:

"It should be the policy of the Department of Defense that acceptance into military service be based on the 'whole man' concept. Each registrant or applicant with a background of drug abuse should be carefully processed to determine the individual's physical and emotional capacity for useful military service. Enlistment and induction standards, including the granting of waivers thereto, should be established by each Service."

In the education area, the Task Force specifically recommends that those disciplines so important to helping us cope with this problem be specifically informed and trained in the area of drug abuse. The categories of professional individuals specifically listed are the Judge Advocates, the Chaplains, and the Medical community. Perhaps one of the most significant recommendations deals with rehabilitating those individuals who are abusing the various proscribed drugs. The Task Force Report specifically recommends an "amnesty program" to encourage voluntary participation by those members who are abusing drugs and sincerely wish to help themselves to eliminate their drug dependence and voluntarily request such assistance before being apprehended or detected. The recommendation of the Task Group suggests such "amnesty programs" be instituted. This, of course, will be up to each of the Services and must be carefully delineated for the situation at the particular camp or station. For example, as the Committee knows, such a program has already been instituted in various parts of the Republic of Vietnam and from all reports is having a salutary and beneficial effect.

Deliberated Long And Hard

The Task Force deliberated long and hard on this recommendation because there must be a balancing of seeking to rehabilitate an individual with the equally important and necessary precept of military life which is discipline.

We must be certain that any "amnesty program" will not deter the maintenance of military posture and discipline throughout the Armed Services. It is for this reason that the recommendation is couched in terms of "an amnesty program . . . should be given a trial." In short, we believe that this is one area of responsibility that appears to have means of aiding some of the less mature members of the Department of Defense who experiment and become trapped through the abuse of some of these dangerous drugs. However, these programs must be tempered by the over-all responsibilities of a military commander to be certain that such programs do not have a back lash or a counter-productive effect on maintaining an effective fighting force which must be ready to fulfill the mission for which it was created.

Secretary Laird Names High Level Group To Act On Blue Ribbon Defense Report

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expect that their action will lead to significant savings in Fiscal Year 1972 and beyond.

"I anticipate that we will make a number of major decisions within the next 30-60 days.

"Dave Packard (Deputy Secretary of Defense) and I have decided to establish an all-Service Blue Ribbon Action Committee to assist us in implementing decisions we make in response to recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. The establishment of this all-Service Action Committee is a part of our program of participatory management.

"It will be the responsibility of the Action Committee, headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) Robert F. Froehlke, to work with Dave Packard and me to convert selected basic recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel into operation as rapidly as possible. This committee will work out the details of the implementing orders, directives, and instructions so that there will be no interruption to continued combat readiness of our forces.

"Obviously, it would have been possible for us to have unilaterally taken action in response to the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's recommendations; but, this is not our approach to management of the Department of Defense.

"From the beginning, we have worked to develop a team effort and to decentralize responsibilities to the maximum extent possible, consistent, of course, with our responsibilities for the direction and control of the Department of Defense.

"Serving with Assistant Secretary Froehlke will be a team of experienced general and flag officers from all four Services. There will also be representation from the JCS-Joint Staff and from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

"It is not our intention that this Action Committee will restudy the work that was done by the Fitzhugh Panel. Instead, it will be the mission of the Action Committee to expedite the implementation of decisions as they are made.

"As to specific decisions, I am not prepared today (Aug. 26) to report any to you, except to express our current thinking that if other proposals made by the Fitzhugh Panel are implemented effectively, it does not, at this time, appear necessary to establish a total of three Deputy Secretaries.

"I can report to you that Dave Packard and I, during recent weeks, have had a number of discussions, individually and collectively, with a broad range of senior civilian and military people throughout the Department of Defense. In these discussions, we have, for example, conferred at some length with the Service Secretaries, the Service Chiefs and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we will want to have additional talks as we take action to improve the management of the Department of Defense.

"In conclusion, I want to repeat that this is going to be a team effort, for that is the way Dave Packard and I do business."

Secretary Of State Rogers — Part II

The U.N. And The U.S. In The 1970s

The second portion of an Aug. 6 statement by Secretary of State William P. Rogers before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements is concluded here. Secretary Rogers explored the gains that the United Nations had made in the first 25 years and outlined the hopes that the Administration has for the growth of the Organization's role in the coming decade.

The **third area** we are examining is how the United Nations system can improve its performance as an operating institution. Raising the performance level means attention to budgetary and financial problems and to parliamentary and administrative procedures. Along with many of the larger contributors to the U.N. budget, we have become increasingly concerned about rising costs and about the need to insure adequate accountability on the part of the U.N. and Specialized Agencies for the uses made of our contributions.

It is clear that the U.N. must organize itself to assure better coordination of priorities, better budget planning, and in general a more efficient use of resources. The need to improve the Organization's effectiveness underlies this Administration's request for a contribution of $20 million toward the cost of expanding U.N. headquarters in New York. This will prevent a further fragmentation of central headquarters, which could lead to lower efficiency and increased operating costs.

As many of the witnesses before this Committee have stressed, basic structural changes in the U.N. Charter probably are not feasible at this time. Yet certain procedural reforms could help expedite U.N. action. Selecting members for the main councils with more attention to their ability to contribute to constructive action as the Charter requires, streamlining parliamentary procedures, and avoiding emotional excesses and impractical recommendations are among the steps required for better performance.

In particular, the U.N. system will have to adopt certain institutional reforms to put it in a position to handle larger resources for economic development programs in an efficient manner. A recent study by Sir Robert Jackson of Australia underscored what needs to be done to improve the managerial capacity of the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). It stressed the need to accord more authority and to provide better management tools to the UNDP so that it can serve as the over-all coordinator of the entire U.N. system's effort in economic development and provide direction to the efforts of the various specialized agencies that operate in this field. We have strongly supported these reforms and I am pleased to report that good progress has been made in achieving a wide consensus among member governments in support of those reforms we consider essential. We shall now watch carefully to see that they are implemented promptly by the Administrator of the U.N. Development Program and the agencies concerned.

The **fourth area** we are examining is the possibility of greater use of the U.N. system for technological cooperation aimed at the orderly development of resources and the widest dissemination of the benefits of new technology. For the near future a principal value of the U.N. may well be its ability to draft rules and provide a mechanism for facilitating international cooperation in dealing with new technology. We want to strengthen its capacities in this field, with urgent priority to the international task of protecting man's environment, to the dangers of

'The U.N. system will have to adopt certain institutional reforms to put it in a position to handle larger resources for economic development programs in an efficient manner.'

excessive population growth and to the need to halt the epidemic of abuse of dangerous drugs.

With respect to the seabeds we have taken a major initiative and are pressing for early action. On May 23, 1970, the President called for a treaty under which nations would renounce all national claims over the natural resources of the seabed beyond the point where the high seas reach a depth of 200 meters and would agree to regard these resources as the common heritage of mankind. Under this proposal an international regime would provide for the collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used for international community purposes, particularly economic assistance to developing countries. On Aug. 3 the United States submitted as a working paper for discussion a draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area.

'The problem of safeguarding the environment is of paramount international concern and, at our initiative, it is now under consideration in numerous international forums.'

The problem of safeguarding the environment is of paramount international concern and, at our initiative, it is now under consideration in numerous international forums, including NATO, the OECD and the Economic Commission for Europe. As you are aware, intensive preparations are being made in the U.N. for a conference in Stockholm in 1972 which, for the first time, will focus attention on environmental problems on a global scale. We are cooperating with many government agencies and private institutions in these preparations. We are also working in the U.N. and by other means, to carry out the President's pledge to share with other nations the benefits from our exploration of outer space.

These, Mr. Chairman, are the four areas in which we have been working to enhance the U.N.'s effectiveness. In mentioning them I do not mean to minimize other tasks. We shall continue to support realistic and constructive U.N. efforts to facilitate peaceful decolonization and self-determination. Our recent actions in support of U.N. goals with regard to the questions of Southern Africa are proof of our continuing opposition to policies of apartheid and the denial of the right of self-determination in that part of Africa. In the area of human rights, we shall press for the early establishment of the Office of a U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights. Finally, as you know, the Administration has requested the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the Genocide Convention.

'We must be alert to recognize the interrelationship between international peace and security and these new areas of international concern and cooperation.'

We are acting on this broad range of issues because of our conviction that the U.N. is not only a diplomatic forum for harmonizing the actions of nations, vital as that is. It is also an action agency with important assignments for the 1970s.

The U.N. has developed in many ways little foreseen by its founders. Its purposes remain as stated in the Charter, but its operations have changed and greatly expanded. Horizons are both more limited—as a result of present constraints on the U.N.'s ability to take collective action for peace—and wider, as development needs and the new technology put an even higher premium on international cooperation.

We must be alert to recognize the interrelationship between international peace and security and these new areas of international concern and cooperation. Individual steps in both fields—dealing with the whole complex of conditions that generate national and international tension and dissatisfaction—are the components out of which we must try to build security in the future.

Finally, there are those who say that the U.N. is experiencing a lack of confidence. That may be, but there is no question of its relevance to us and to the world of today and tomorrow. The only realistic choice we have, then, is to make it more effective; to renew its confidence; to help it gain greater public support.

COMMANDERS DIGEST
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Supports Decentralization

Sec. Packard Discusses Blue Ribbon Recommendations

Recent recommendations by a Blue Ribbon Panel for intended improvement in the operations of the Department of Defense were discussed by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in an address Aug. 20 at the Armed Forces Management Association dinner in Los Angeles.

Mr. Packard said he agreed "in particular" with the Panel's "recommendation that more decentralization of the Department of Defense is necessary. To me that means more decision-making at a lower level and less time-consuming and duplicate second guessing topside."

Following are excerpts from his address:

This gives me a problem on the recommendation for the three deputies. We do not want to create a structure that adds more top-level involvement in the working man's business. I appreciate the implications that I have to work hard. I do put in long hours. I assure you, however, that much of my time has been spent doing things that lower levels should do. Three deputies would tend to pull even more decision-making up to the top, and we do not want to move in that direction. What we want to do is give a man a job and let him do it.

Praise For JCS

The report greatly underrates the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have spent a great deal of time working with the Chiefs during the past year and a half. I found them among the finest, most dedicated, most capable men I have ever known. They have given Secretary Laird and me their complete support and cooperation.

There is no question about civilian control of military operations. Secretary Laird or I approve every operating order; but we do need to streamline the chain of command for operations. This will be done on a careful, step-by-step basis because the problems are complex, and also because we need to assure uninterrupted combat readiness of our forces.

We intend to give the Service Secretaries and the Services more responsibility so that they can do their jobs. Before they can do their jobs right they will have to break down some of the multi-layer staffing that has built up over the years and work together better to avoid unnecessary duplication. In short, the problem is not the people—it's the system. And now, how does this apply to the procurement problem and this meeting you have been holding this week?

Bad Management

I suppose that some of our critics will call this a meeting of the military-industrial complex. So be it. I am not embarrassed by the fact that we need industry to help the Department of Defense. I am only embarrassed that we haven't done a better job. Many of you, and certainly those *not* in the industry, may expect me to talk about what a grand job we have all done and how necessary we are for one another. I am not going to do that. I am going to talk about the things we do wrong and the things that we have to do better.

The fact is that there has been bad management of many Defense programs in the past. We spend billions of the taxpayers' dollars; sometimes we spend it badly. Part of this is due to basic uncertainties in the Defense business. Some uncertainties will always exist. However, most of it has been due to bad management, both in the Department of Defense and in the Defense industry. We can and are doing something about that. I am not talking just about cost over-runs as so many of our critics do. Over-runs are the end product of our mistakes rather than the key issue to be addressed. I am surprised that our critics took so long to discover cost over-runs. They have been around for a long time, and many of the cost over-runs that receive the most publicity were organized by Defense and industry years ago. We are now paying the price for mistakes in contracting, in development and in management.

'A Real Mess'

Frankly, gentlemen, in Defense procurement, we have a real mess on our hands, and the question you and I have to face up to is what we are going to do to clean it up.

Let me first mention two things that won't help.

It won't help for Congress to legislate detailed and inflexible rules governing procurement.

Nor will it help to put the General Accounting Office in the process of making management decisions. The GAO deserves the highest marks for auditing, but the talents of a good auditor are not identical with those of a good manager.

The pressures are strong to insert the Congress and its right arm, the GAO, into the details of day-to-day management decisions in the Department of Defense. Until we in the Department and you in Defense industry demonstrate that we can provide capable and efficient management, these pressures will continue.

Frustrating

I have been in this job now for 19 months. Frankly, I am ashamed I have not been able to do very many of the things that need to be done to improve the situation I found here in January 1969. The most frustrating thing is that we know how we ought to manage—you, me, all of us—and we refuse to change based on what we know. Every time we want something done in a hurry and want it done right, we have to take the project out of the system. We give a good man direction and authority and let him go—and it works.

On the other hand, when we are not in a hurry to get things done right, we over-organize, over-man, over-spend, and under-accomplish.

We need good people—and by that I mean you—who will step up to their responsibilities. That is what decentralization is all about.

In the hope you would do this, on May 28 I issued a memorandum of guidelines for Major Weapons System Acquisition.

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Blue Ribbon Recommendations

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There is nothing in this memorandum that you don't already know. As a matter of fact, the management principles in my memorandum are so simple that anyone who could not have written the memorandum himself doesn't belong in management. Again and again I have made a big point about getting the right man in the right job and giving him authority. But it is just not that simple. Admiral (H. G.) Rickover is a good example. The Admiral is a man of considerable capability. He has his own style, but he produces. He got a program, had to fight the system tooth and nail to get it, challenges the system every chance he gets, but is still saddled with the system. I had a long talk with him after the 28 May memorandum was published, and it was clear that I hadn't taught him anything about management. He told me that the principles were great but that if we couldn't get to the system that sits on top of the manager, nothing else mattered. He is right.

Contrary Actions

I know Secretary Laird and I bear the responsibility for the system in the Department of Defense, and I am going to keep working at it. But you in industry bear a similar responsibility, and I expect you to do the same thing.

In my memo I told the Services to select people with the right background and education for management, give them appropriate training, give them recognition, and leave them on the job long enough to get something done.

All four Services have accepted my recommendations—and their letters say that they agree. But on at least two occasions they have taken actions exactly contrary to those suggested. The Air Force and the Navy are both involved. In one case, a small dedicated Air Force team developed the gunships which have been so successful in Vietnam. The Air Force decided to put this program into its formal system. About a month ago I asked when we would be able to get some more gunships. The answer was in two years. That program is now out of the Air Force system, and we will have more gunships in six months.

In the other case the Navy, shortly after agreeing that a good manager should be kept on the job long enough to get it done right, proceeded to promote a key manager at a critical time from an important program to another assignment. The system wins and the cause of good management loses.

Share The Blame

In my memo I talked about policies for development of new weapon systems. The lesson that comes through loud and clear here is we should buy *only* what we need—not systems you or anyone else think they can develop to do something that doesn't need to be done.

The Defense Department has been led down the garden path for years on sophisticated systems that you promised would do all kinds of things for some optimistic cost. Too frequently we have been wrong in listening to you, and more frequently you have been unable to deliver on either of these promises—what it would do or what it would cost. And we in the past have sometimes been guilty of over-optimism on our cost estimates and over-demanding in our requirements.

Deputy Secretary David Packard

We share the blame together, but the mistakes of the past cannot be repeated if we are to provide for the nation's defenses in today's climate of a critical public and a critical Congress.

We are going to buy only things that we need, and we are going to make sure they work before we buy. The same thought carries over into full-scale development and production. We must know what we are going to do and how to do it before we go into production. We are not going to put things into development until we are sure we need them, and we are not going to put things into production until we are sure that they work.

Speaks Frankly

This has been a short speech. I have tried to speak very frankly because the problem is very real. It is you people here tonight and the Department of Defense that must take action to solve these problems. We recognize that these problems cannot be solved overnight and perhaps some of them cannot be solved at all, but it is very clear that it is unacceptable to continue to do business as we have done it in the past.

The things I have had to say and the things I said in my 28 May memorandum are simple. Many times we have done a bad job—we are going to do a better one. We are going to know what we are doing before we do it, and we are going to manage it better. We have a lot of obstacles in front of us and some of them we created ourselves. We have given our critics the opportunity to find us at fault, and we run the danger that their efforts to direct Defense management will just compound the mistakes in the Department.

We don't need more supervision and more people in the act. We need fewer people.

The system in the Department of Defense is going to change. Secretary Laird and I are going to demand it. I expect you who are here tonight and everyone else who does business with the Department of Defense to do the same. That is all I have to say.

DoD Clarifies Reserve Obligation

Defense officials want to be sure that servicemen being separated from active duty and their commanders have a clear understanding of current Reserve obligation policy.

They point out that most persons incur a military service obligation of six years when they enter the Armed Forces, and that a combination of active duty and service in the Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve may be used to fulfill that obligation.

So, an individual returning to civilian life still will have some part of that obligation remaining, unless he served six or more years on active duty. He can meet that obligation by serving in a Reserve component: the Army, Naval, Air Force, Marine Corps or Coast Guard Reserve; the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard. With the exception of the National Guard, these Reserve components are made up of a Ready Reserve and a Standby Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is subject to active duty in time of war or national emergency proclaimed by the President or declared by the Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law. Ready Reservists are assigned to units and take part in regular training programs, for which they are paid. All members of the National Guard are in Ready Reserve units.

The Standby Reserve is subject to active duty only when war or national emergency is declared by the Congress or when otherwise authorized by law. Standby Reservists serve no further active duty or active duty training.

The Ready Reserve has two sub-categories, the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve.

The Selected Reserve consists of National Guard and Reserve units whose members have volunteered to join them. They have periodic training drills and an annual active duty training period.

A former serviceman with a remaining Reserve obligation can by law be assigned involuntarily to the Selected Reserve. However, Defense Department policy provides that an individual who (1) has served two years on active duty or (2) has served in a combat zone on active duty or (3) has been wounded in action, will *not* be assigned involuntarily to the Selected Reserve. Exceptions to this policy are when he has incurred by separate agreement an obligation for such service, or when a Reserve vacancy for which he is qualified cannot otherwise be filled.

The Individual Ready Reserve is a pool of Reservists not organized into units. They are primarily prior servicemen who have served two or more years on active duty. Individual Ready Reservists are subject to being ordered to active duty for training for a period of two weeks or 30 days annually.

Individuals with prior service are eligible for transfer to the Standby Reserve after five years of satisfactory active and Reserve service.

The military Services place individuals with remaining military obligations in appropriate Reserve assignments after their separation from active duty.

Vice Admiral Charles K. Duncan has been appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, to succeed Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes. Vice Admiral Duncan, currently Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Naval Reserve) and Chief of Naval Personnel, will report to his new assignment Oct. 1. Admiral Holmes retires Sept. 30.

Enemy Restricts Mail In North Vietnam

American prisoners of war in North Vietnam have been allowed to send only 562 letters and cards to their families since Jan. 1, but the Department of Defense concludes the figure should be 15,000 or more.

The Pentagon has also revealed that some prisoners have been allowed to receive packages from the families, but not cards and letters.

The DoD's higher figure for PW correspondence is based on Article 71 of the Geneva Convention which says the detaining power must allow each PW to send at least two letters and four cards each month.

Under that monthly minimum, Defense officials said the families of the 376 known PWs in North Vietnam should have received more than 15,000 letters and cards.

Some letters written by PWs indicate they receive packages but not letters from their families. PWs captured as long ago as June 1966 have written to comment on packages received and to plead for an occasional letter, officials said.

"These letters have been received by wives who have been writing regularly to their husbands since the men were captured," an official said.

In one instance, a PW captured in 1967 writing about the child he has never seen refers only to "child" even though his wife has written repeatedly to tell him the sex, name and other facts about the "child."

An official said, "Obviously, he has not been allowed to receive mail or know the sex, name and other facts."

It was pointed out that no mail has ever been received from any PW held by the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam, where 78 Americans are listed as captured and 402 are missing, nor from Laos, where DoD lists three Americans captured and 224 missing.

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